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Abstract 
We have good reason to condemn lying more strongly than misleading and to 
condemn bullshit assertion less harshly than lying but more harshly than misleading. 
We each have good reason to mislead rather than make bullshit assertions, but to 
make bullshit assertions rather than lie. This is because these forms of deception 
damage credibility in different ways. We can trust the misleader to assert only what 
they believe to be true. We can trust the bullshitter not to assert what they believe to 
be false. We cannot trust the liar at all. 
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Successful lying and misleading are both forms of intentional deception by means of 
language. The liar deceives by false assertion, the misleader by false conversational 
implicature. I argue that society has good reason to respond with greater 
opprobrium to the liar than to the misleader, that each member of society has good 
reason to disdain lying more than mere misleading, and that each of us would be 
wise to avoid the greater dishonour of being branded a liar. My argument rests on 
the point that lying damages both credibility in assertion and credibility in 
implicature whereas misleading damages only credibility in implicature. 
 
I further argue that deceptive communication without regard to truth value, which 
Frankfurt memorably identified as the essence of bullshit, should be understood in 
the same framework. Bullshit conversational implicature damages credibility in the 
same way as does misleading. Bullshit assertion damages one variety of credibility in 
assertion, and thereby damages credibility in implicature, but leaves the other 
variety of credibility in assertion intact. Since lying damages both varieties of 
credibility in assertion, it damages credibility more comprehensively. 
 
1. Credibility in Assertion and Implicature 
 
Assertion is the direct expression of a proposition. But the utterance of an assertion 
also conveys meaning beyond the proposition asserted. Implicature is meaning 
conveyed that is neither asserted nor logically entailed by what is asserted. 
Conversational implicature is communicated as a result of the conversational context 
of an assertion. It rests on the assumption that the speaker is cooperating in 
furthering the ends of the conversation. In conversations where credibility is at stake, 
cooperation requires being informative. To lie is to express a proposition one believes 
to be false. To mislead is to express a proposition with the intention that it carry in 
the context a particular false conversational implicature. Both lying and misleading 
are therefore forms of deception, and so violate the requirement to be informative. 
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To be caught lying damages your credibility in assertion. If you have deceived by 
assertion in the past, then those who know this should be wary of trusting your 
assertions. If the lie had concerned a trivial matter, of course, then it should not 
damage your credibility with respect to important matters. The more important the 
lie, the more generally it damages your credibility. Deception by implicature likewise 
damages your credibility in implicature. If you have been caught making misleading 
statements, then those who know this about you should be wary of believing the 
conversational implicatures of your assertions. 
 
One can damage one's credibility in implicature without thereby damaging one’s 
credibility in assertion. In a famous television interview, journalist Jeremy Paxman 
asked Michael Howard, who had recently ceased to be UK Home Secretary, the same 
question twelve times within two minutes. It was a simple question, requiring a 'yes' 
or 'no' answer. Howard gave neither, filibustering instead. The repetition made it 
clear that he had attempted to implicate that the answer was not 'yes', but would not 
say 'no'. It seems that he allowed it to become obvious that he had attempted to give 
a false conversational implicature rather than running the risk of being caught lying. 
Indeed, his persistence in refusing to lie even though this exposed him as having 
attempted to mislead arguably enhances his credibility in assertion.1 
 
Although one can preserve and even enhance one's credibility in assertion through 
speech that damages one's credibility in implicature, the converse is not possible. 
Implicature depends on the assumption that the speaker is cooperating in furthering 
the ends of the conversation (Adler 1997: 445; Saul 2012: 5-6). On this assumption, 
Howard's response implicates that the correct answer to Paxman's question is not 
'yes', for if it were then it would have been more informative, hence more 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 You can find this interview by typing “did you threaten to overrule him?” into the search 
box at www.youtube.com. 
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cooperative, to say 'yes'. A cooperative speaker would not make assertions they do 
not believe to be true, unless the shared ends of the conversation required it. For this 
reason, the assumption that grounds implicature also implies credibility in assertion. 
To damage one's own credibility in assertion, therefore, is also to damage one's 
credibility in implicature. 
 
2. Asymmetric Credibility and Degrees of Badness 
 
Discussions of the relative ethical status of lying and misleading focus on whether 
the two stand in different positions on some ethically relevant scale. One argument 
of this kind holds that the liar is wholly responsible for their deception whereas the 
misleader shares this responsibility with the deceived. This is mistaken on two 
counts. First, conversational implicature is not the result of optional inference, but 
the outcome of an assumption that conversational partners are obliged to make, 
namely the assumption of cooperation (Adler 1997: 445; Saul 2012: 5-6). Second, it is 
not generally true that my action of harming you is less bad in proportion to the 
degree to which you are responsible for the harm coming about (Saul 2012: 4-5). 
 
Strudler takes a different form of this approach, arguing that lying reduces the 
deceived's control over the conversation to a greater degree than does misleading, 
that a reduction in such control is a harm, and thus that lying inflicts a greater harm 
on the deceived than does misleading. Strudler rests this argument on the claim that 
'one may lose credibility as trustworthy in implicature about a proposition but retain 
credibility as trustworthy in assertion about the very same proposition' (2010: 176). If 
you suspect you are being misled, you can question the implicated proposition 
without engendering the 'collapse of trust' that would result from questioning 
whether an assertion was an outright lie (2010: 176). Thus, on this view, the liar 
leaves their victim with fewer conversational options than does the misleader. 
 
5 / 13!
Strudler has not explained why questioning someone's assertion is more destructive 
of trust than is questioning their conversational implicature. Perhaps it is an 
empirical fact, in our culture at least, that this is so, but the point that you are obliged 
to accept your conversational partner's implicatures suggests that it ought not be so 
(see also Saul 2012: 7 n5). The asymmetric dependency of credibility in implicature 
on credibility in assertion, however, does directly entail that questioning someone's 
assertion is more destructive of trust than is questioning their conversational 
implicature. For the former implies that they are not trusted in assertion or 
implicature, the latter only in implicature. 
 
Once this point about asymmetric dependence between the two domains of 
credibility is established, there is no longer any need to derive the further claim that 
it grounds a difference in degree of harm done to the victim. For that asymmetry 
itself justifies society in reserving a more severe opprobrium for lying than is to be 
employed in response to misleading. An act that damages an informant's credibility 
across the board is considerably more detrimental to our collective needs as an 
epistemic community than is an act that only damages the credibility of that 
informant’s conversational implicatures. The latter leaves us with the option of 
checking such implicatures by asking the same informant the requisite simple 
question, as Paxman did to Howard, or indeed by asking the catch-all question ‘to 
the best of your knowledge, are there other relevant facts?’ (Adler 1997: 440). But if 
we cannot trust someone's assertions, we cannot use them as an informant at all. 
 
3. Never Lie When You Can Mislead 
 
Because it is right in this way for society to treat liars more severely than misleaders, 
each of us has good reason to mislead rather than to lie when faced with that choice. 
For each member of society has good reason to have a stronger negative attitude 
towards lying than towards misleading. Each of us needs to be able to rely on others 
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as informants. We can still rely on misleaders, though we need to be careful, but 
cannot rely on liars. Each of us, therefore, has good reason to prefer to mislead than 
to lie, because according to the standards we ourselves ought to have, lying is more 
condemnable than misleading. 
 
Moreover, one needs to be able to rely on one’s own status as an informant of other 
people. If one is caught lying, then that status generally is damaged. If one is caught 
misleading, one retains credibility in one's assertions and can even have enhanced it. 
Had the boy who cried wolf instead had his fun by merely implicating that there 
were wolves, he would still have been able to communicate the later actual presence 
of a wolf by explicit assertion. He would have had a greater chance, that is to say, of 
avoiding his sheep being eaten by a wolf. 
 
It is not only your ability to communicate truths that suffers more if you are caught 
lying than if you are caught misleading. There is the same differential effect on your 
ability to deceive. If you are caught misleading, your credibility in implicature will 
be damaged, but your credibility in assertion will remain intact and may be 
enhanced. Thus you would retain the option of lying in future. But if you are caught 
lying, you have damaged your credibility in assertion and in implicature. You have 
damaged your chances of successfully deceiving by either method. 
 
None of this is to say that every discovered lie must destroy the liar's credibility 
altogether. With both lying and misleading, the damage done depends on the 
importance of the information withheld and perhaps whether it is the first offence or 
part of a pattern. The damage can also be undone by remorse and forgiveness, or just 
by better behaviour over a sufficiently sustained period. The point is simply that, 
when all other aspects of the case are equal, lying is more damaging than misleading. 
Saul is thus mistaken to claim that 'you might as well just go ahead and lie' (2012: 8). 
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Really, that is the very last thing you should do. And we should continue to 
discourage lying more strongly than we discourage misleading. 
 
4. Assertion, Implicature, and Bullshit 
 
Frankfurt has argued that bullshit is ‘a greater enemy of the truth than lies are’ 
because it involves disregard for the truth value of what is said whereas lies are 
guided by the truth they aim to conceal (1988: 132). If this is right, then it would seem 
that we ought to censure bullshit more harshly than we censure lies. We will see, 
however, that bullshit is not a greater enemy of the truth since lies damage 
credibility more comprehensively than bullshit does. But first, some clarification. 
 
Frankfurt intends his idea of disregard for the truth to mean that the bullshitter may 
believe some of what they say, may disbelieve some of what they say, and willingly 
says things they neither believe nor disbelieve. The bullshitter simply ‘does not care 
whether the things he says describe reality correctly’ (1988: 131). However, saying 
what one believes to be false makes one a liar irrespective of whether the falsehood 
of the content is essential to one’s purpose in communicating that content. So the 
only aspect of bullshitting that has a distinct relation to credibility is the willingness 
to say things one neither believes nor disbelieves. What is the effect of this hard core 
of bullshit on one’s credibility? 
 
The distinction between assertion and conversational implicature applies here. 
Frankfurt does not employ this distinction, which is why some of his examples 
appear to contradict his central thesis that bullshit is not guided by the truth. He 
considers, for example, the advice 'never lie when you can bullshit your way 
through' (1988: 129-30). Since one is tempted to lie only when one knows the truth 
and wants to conceal it, this bullshit is guided by the truth to some extent. We can 
make this example consistent with Frankfurt's central thesis by distinguishing the 
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assertions made without regard for their truth value from the conversational 
implicatures intended to conceal the truth. Since this is deception by conversational 
implicature, it is a form of misleading. It is misleading by bullshit assertion.  
 
Conversely, one can communicate bullshit conversational implicatures. If one's 
intention is to instil in one’s audience a particular belief that one neither believes nor 
disbelieves, then one can pursue this aim by making assertions that carry the target 
proposition as a conversational implicature. One could implicate it by asserting only 
truths, which might be a wise strategy for politicians or advertisers. But one could 
implicate it through assertions one believes to be false. Thus, there is bullshit through 
truth-telling and there can be bullshit through lying. 
 
Finally, there is pure bullshit. This is where the speaker neither believes nor 
disbelieves either their assertions or their conversational implicatures. Such pure 
bullshit might be motivated by the desire to present oneself to a naive audience as an 
expert in some area in which one is not, in fact, an expert. 
 
Frankfurt's examples are thus not inconsistent, but track different linguistic roles that 
bullshit can play. Cohen is mistaken, therefore, to argue that the variety of speaker 
intentions in Frankfurt's examples indicates that bullshit cannot be understood 
primarily in terms of speaker intention but must rather be a feature of the content 
communicated (2002: 325-31). If we distinguish what speakers assert from what they 
conversationally implicate, there remains an identifiable phenomenon of 
intentionally communicating content without regard for its truth value, the hard core 
case of which is intentionally communicating a content that one neither believes nor 
disbelieves. We can ask of this phenomenon whether it is a greater threat to truth 
than lying, or than misleading, and whether we should respond to it with greater 
opprobrium. 
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5. Bullshit and Credibility in Implicature 
 
Frankfurt describes disregard for truth value as ‘of the essence of bullshit’ (1988: 
125). But it is not the whole of the essence. For other kinds of speech, such as telling 
stories or jokes, involve a disregard for the truth of what is said. It is also essential to 
bullshit that the speaker intends to conceal the fact that they are speaking without 
regard to the truth (1988: 130). Neither assertions nor conversational implicatures can 
count as bullshit unless the speaker has this deceptive intention. 
 
Bullshit has this deception in common with both lying and misleading. It is at the 
heart of the damage done to credibility by each of these kinds of speech. Telling 
stories or jokes leaves credibility undamaged precisely because these are not 
presented as informative. If falsehood or bullshit is presented as informative, it 
becomes difficult to identify the occasions on which that speaker really is being 
informative. It thus becomes difficult to rely on that person as an informant. 
 
Whether we should condemn bullshit as harshly as we condemn lying is therefore a 
matter of the kind of damage it does to credibility. It is clear that bullshit damages 
the assumption of cooperation. Misleading by bullshit assertion and intentionally 
giving bullshit implicatures are both ways of misinforming. Because it damages the 
assumption of cooperation, all bullshit damages credibility in implicature. We 
therefore should not treat cases of bullshit less harshly than cases of misleading. 
 
The question remains, however, whether we should treat bullshit assertion more 
harshly than misleading. We should do so if bullshit damages credibility in assertion. 
If it does, then the way in which it does so will address the issue Frankfurt raises: 
should we treat bullshit less harshly than, with the same harshness as, or more 
harshly than lying? 
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6. Bullshit and Credibility in Assertion 
 
To what extent does assertion without belief in the truth or falsehood of what is 
asserted, irrespective of the status of its implicatures, damage credibility in assertion? 
The answer to this question depends on the nature of the assumption underlying 
that credibility. We have seen that this assumption is entailed by the assumption of 
cooperation, but does not entail it. This is why lying damages credibility in 
implicature but misleading does not damage credibility in assertion. There are two 
candidate assumptions that would fit this bill. One is the assumption that the speaker 
would only make assertions they believe to be true. The other is that the speaker 
would not make assertions they believe to be false. 
 
That these two assumptions are genuinely distinct is shown by the fact that assertion 
without belief in the truth or falsehood of what is asserted contravenes the first but 
not the second. So if you know that someone engages in this core variety of bullshit 
assertion, you are no longer warranted in assuming that they say only what they 
believe to be true. But you are not warranted in ceasing to assume that they would 
not knowingly assert a falsehood. 
 
For this reason, suspected cases of hard core bullshit assertion can be challenged in a 
parallel way to suspected false conversational implicatures. With conversational 
implicature, one can ask a simple question about the truth of that implicature. This 
forces the speaker to lie, to admit that the implicature is false, or to reveal the 
falsehood of the implicature by attempting to avoid answering the question. 
 
In the case of bullshit assertion, one cannot simply ask whether the assertion is true. 
For the speaker could answer that question with more bullshit. One must rather 
exploit the fact that bullshit involves the intention to conceal the lack of concern for 
truth value. One can challenge a hard core bullshit assertion, therefore, by enquiring 
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directly whether the speaker believes the assertion to be true. The simplest, though 
least polite, way to raise this challenge is a one-word sentence: Bullshit!  
 
Faced with this enquiry, the bullshitter has good reason not to claim that they believe 
the assertion to be true. For this would make them a liar. Just as there are good 
reasons to opt for being discovered as a misleader rather than risk being branded a 
liar, reasons that Howard recognised in his interview with Paxman, the same reasons 
support being discovered as having made bullshit assertions rather than lying. 
 
The damage done to one’s credibility by this discovery is greater than the damage 
done by being seen as a misleader. For hard core bullshit assertion damages the 
assumption that one would assert only what one believes to be true. But it leaves 
intact the assumption that one would not make assertions one believes to be false. 
One retains some of the credibility that would be lost were one to be caught lying. 
 
7. The Importance of Being Honest 
 
We should not agree with Frankfurt’s proposal that bullshit is a greater threat to 
truth than is lying. We have good reason to respond with a greater opprobrium to 
lies than to bullshit. But we should respond to bullshit assertion with greater 
opprobrium than we employ in response to mere misleading. And we should treat 
misleading and truth-telling with bullshit implicature equivalently. For the different 
types of deception damage credibility in different ways. 
 
As an epistemic community, we have good reason to protect the credibility of the 
members of the community in general. So we have good reason to reproach those 
who damage their own credibility. Moreover, we have good reason to grade our 
reproach according to the degree of damage done to credibility by different forms of 
deception. This is because, as Adler (1997: 448-9) points out, people will occasionally 
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feel a need to deceive. To accommodate that felt need by allowing deception under 
specific circumstances, as Saul (2012: 6) suggests, would require agreement on the 
relevant range of circumstances. Graded responses to varieties of deception allow us 
to exert pressure to preserve credibility without agreeing on circumstances in which 
deception is permissible.  
 
None of this is to say that we should view every instance of lying as morally worse 
than any instance of bullshit or of misleading. Neither is it to say that the damage 
done to credibility is the only reason we have to reproach a deceiver. For any act of 
deception will also fall under other descriptions that may be morally relevant and 
any act of deception will have consequences that may be morally relevant. Bullshit 
medical advice is worse than lying to ensure a surprise party remains a surprise. 
 
The point is just that the degree of opprobrium with which we should respond to a 
case of insincere communication depends in part on whether that insincerity 
concerns assertion or conversational implicature, and if it concerns assertion then it 
also depends on whether at the time the offender held the assertion to be false or had 
no belief about its truth value. These graded responses should be reflected in the 
attitudes of each member of society, not only because that is required for society to 
exert this pressure but also because each person has good reasons to preserve their 
own credibility. Honesty is the best policy. But if you must depart from it, then you 
should mislead first, bullshit second, and lie only as a last resort.2 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 I am grateful to Clea Rees, Nick Shackel, and Suzi Wells for conversations that informed this 
paper and to Jenny Saul for helpful criticism of the first submission. 
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